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ABSTRACT: There is a tendency both in academia and in popular understandings to posit emotions 
against rationality and to judge them as an expression of intellectual inferiority. This could not be 
more evident than in current accounts of populism, which often describe populist supporters as 
overtaken by passions rather than relying on rational deliberation. However these arguments 
hardly stand up to scientific scrutiny. As I will show by reviewing the state-of-the-art, advance-
ments in disciplines such as political psychology have now provided systematic evidence of how, 
contrary to what is traditionally rooted in the public imaginary, emotions and cognition work in 
concert. If emotionality is an integral part of decision-making and is vital to any type of political 
engagement, the question we should rather ask is what is peculiar about the relationship between 
emotions and populism. In the second part of the article, I will explore how the emotional ‘supply 
and demand’ intersect in our contemporary societies, where capitalism, individualism and glob-
alisation have created particular affective states that provide fertile ground for the populist ap-
peal to resonate. By examining the emotions-populism relationship based on three broad dimen-
sions - structural, subjective and communicative -, this article provides a multilevel analysis that 
unpacks the significance of emotions for the emergence, diffusion and success of populism. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The ideal of the supremacy of reason is deeply rooted in our cultures. Since the En-
lightenment Age, the public imaginary has perpetuated an eternal conflict between 
emotions and reason, prioritising the rational while condemning the passional. The glo-
rification of science, research and rationality that started during that age, has gradually 
shaped our vision of what ‘righteous decision-making’ should look like: it should involve 
reason, conscious deliberation, attentive and scrupulous analysis; with experience, it will 
provide us with wisdom and the ability to distinguish right from wrong; and when we 
master it, we are finally able to put ‘the mind’ before ‘the heart’. This century-old ‘ra-
tionality versus emotionality’ idea is now cemented in our common understanding of 
emotions. The ‘heart’ is considered a place of grand and overwhelming feelings that gifts 
us with some of the most profound and powerful experiences. It is however only a place 
for experience, not for decisions, and on the battle against the ‘mind’, it is on the losing 
side. 
Emotions are considered the ‘Other of rationality’ (Demertzis 2014) and decisions that 
are said to be based on them, rather than careful thinking, are usually dismissed and 
downgraded (Jenkins 2018). This could not be more evident than in the study of politics. 
Phenomena such as totalitarianism, propaganda and populism have historically been ex-
amined by equating emotionality with demagogy, manipulation, and treating the 
‘masses’ as slaves to irrational desires. For decades, emotions have been posited in a 
presumed antagonistic relationship with rationality and “believed to reflect intellectually 
inferior and often socially and morally irresponsible attitudes and forms of conduct” 
(Freeden 2013, 2). The renewed attention devoted to the populist phenomenon has only 
resurfaced this problematic approach. 
The debate over emotions adds further complexity to populism research, a field of 
inquiry already characterized by widespread disagreement and a lack of full definitional 
consensus over the essence of the phenomenon and its main manifestations. When at-
tempting to define what populism is, scholars focus on a recurrent set of characteristics 
that populist parties display, most notably the commendation of and appeal to a virtuous 
‘ordinary people’ accompanied by a vilification of a corrupt establishment (Mudde 2004, 
Taggart 2000). Additional accounts highlight the charismatic personality of populist par-
ties’ leaders (Meny and Surel 2001), a straightforward and simplified political message 
similar to demagogy (Taguieff 2007), a particular mode of party organisation revolving 
around the leader (Weyland 2001) or a performance of crisis (Moffitt 2015).  Such variety 
of aspects highlighted by the available scholarship is mirrored into a wide range of defi-
nitions that see populism as an ideology (Mudde 2004), style (Moffitt and Tormey 2014), 
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discourse (Panizza 2005), logic (Laclau 2005) or organisation mode (Weyland 2001). In 
this article, I regard populism ‘to be first and foremost about ideas’ (Mudde 2017), thus 
following an ideational approach that conceptualises the phenomenon as a thin ideology 
“that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antago-
nistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics 
should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 
2004, 543). It is however worth noting that some authors suggest tackling the defini-
tional challenge by appraising populism as a matter of degree; as Caiani and Graziano 
(2016) argue, the various definitional attributes can be aggregated into a set of dimen-
sions, namely rhetoric, ideology, organization and style of communication, that would 
allow scholars to proceed with a radial (rather than dichotomous) definition.  
While the debate over populism as a discrete or continuous concept continues, au-
thors concur on the need to adopt typological distinctions in order to shed light on its 
different manifestations (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). In Europe, a subfamily of right-
wing populists is particularly common - the populist radical right – which combines pop-
ulism with nativist and authoritarian ideological features (Mudde 2007). Because of the 
exclusionary nature of their discourse and their emphasis on law, order and authority, 
these parties have particularly influenced the way both academics and the public think 
about the relationship between emotions and populism. The term ‘populism’ has be-
come a synonym to actually indicate the populist radical right and, as such, discourses 
filled with hate, anger, fear and nostalgia for a glorious past. Populist voters have been 
collectively accused of acting out of collective rage and cast their ballot based on gut-
feelings rather than reasoning and deliberation. In many cases, they have been dismissed 
as bigots and a “basket of deplorable”. Mainstream parties across Europe have widely 
denounced populist parties are irresponsible actors for fuelling emotions rather than 
fostering a rational debate, and thus causing political and civic turmoil.  
Such an approach is problematic in that it dismisses populism as irrationality en masse, 
downplaying grievances and concerns of populist voters as irrelevant or wrongly placed. 
Moreover, the dichotomy emotions vs. reason hardly stands up to scientific scrutiny. As 
this article will show by reviewing the state-of-the-art, advancements in disciplines such 
as political psychology have now provided systematic evidence of the absence of any 
sharp distinction between cognition and emotions as traditionally rooted in the public 
imaginary. After clarifying what emotions are and showing their inherent relationship 
with decision-making, the article will discuss their relevance to the study of politics. If 
emotionality is an integral part of decision-making and is vital to any type of political 
engagement, the question we should rather ask is what is peculiar about the relationship 
between emotions and populism. In the second part of the article, I will thus explore 
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how the emotional ‘supply and demand’ intersect in our contemporary societies, where 
capitalism, individualism and globalisation have created particular affective states of 
grievances, resentment and ontological insecurities that provide fertile ground for the 
populist appeal to resonate. I propose examining the emotions-populism relationship by 
looking at three broad dimensions – the structural, subjective and communicative – as 
this allows us to develop an integrated understanding of how emotions are produced at 
the macro-level, perceived at the individual level and further reproduced through polit-
ical narratives. Via this multi-level analysis, the article contributes to unpacking the sig-
nificance of emotions for the emergence, diffusion and success of populism. 
 
 
2. Absolving Emotions  
 
What do we mean when we speak about emotions? Emotions have been theorised 
differently in the literature but it is now widely agreed that they are the result of neural 
processes in the brain (Brader and Marcus 2013) and, as further evidenced by neurosci-
ence research, they display an intimate interconnection with cognition (Marcus et al. 
2011). 
One of the most prominent accounts in the literature, the theory of affective intelli-
gence (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000) posits that emotions are the display of feel-
ings generated by the interaction between our personal goals and the surrounding envi-
ronment. When our goals are met, we experience emotions of positive valence along 
the dimension of enthusiasm, such as happiness, hope or pride. These emotions tell the 
brain that a goal has been accomplished and the brain responds promptly by reinforcing 
existing attitudes and encouraging the establishment of routinized behaviour, as these 
have been found successful in securing the initial accomplishment (Marcus and MacKuen 
1993). On the contrary, when our goals are threatened, we experience feelings of nega-
tive valence, along the dimension of anxiety; our brain, in response, suspends routines 
and rather than relying on existing knowledge and attitudes, examines all information 
more accurately, in order to reduce threat and uncertainty (ibid.). Finally, when our goals 
are not met, we experience aversion, which taps into feelings of anger, contempt, frus-
tration or disgust. Unlike what happens with anxiety, aversion is brought about by events 
which challenge us but that are not entirely unknown or uncertain; as a consequence, 
our brain does not scan the environment for new information but rather reacts by cling-
ing to previously held opinions (Marcus et al. 2000). According to this theory, these three 
systems – enthusiasm, anxiety and aversion – generate a set of emotions that in turn 
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affect the way we think and behave in the social world. Emotions thus precede cognition 
but also work in concert with it in determining the different ways we navigate reality.  
This theory represents a ‘dimensional approach’ to emotions, because it conceptual-
ises them along the valence dimension (negative-positive) in each system and clusters 
them accordingly. Another approach, the so-called appraisal theory, differentiates more 
finely among emotions based on the way the individual appraises the surrounding envi-
ronment. The central tenant of this approach is that emotions do not arise from a situa-
tion per se, but from the individual’s own interpretations of it, both at the conscious and 
preconscious levels (Lazarus 1991). As an evolutionary survival function, the individual 
continuously scans the surrounding environment and appraises all its characteristics, 
leading to the arousal of certain emotions that relate closely to those evaluations. This 
means that, unlike the theory of affective intelligence, appraisals theory does not con-
ceptualise emotions along a set of dimensions, but rather as discrete, that is, distinguish-
able from one another. Fear can be a fruitful example to this regard: whereas in the 
theory of affective intelligence, this emotion is but one possible along the anxiety dimen-
sion, for appraisal theorists fear and anxiety can be clearly separated because the first 
results from the appraisal of a specific and identifiable threat whereas the latter is an 
appraisal of uncertainty and a diffuse, non identifiable danger (Smith and Ellsworth 
1985). In this theoretical account, each emotion is therefore the product of specific com-
binations of cognitive appraisals; appraisals are automatic but nonetheless cognitive, be-
cause they result from how the individual elaborates and makes sense of the surround-
ings in relation to his or her own needs. Scholars within this approach have identified 
several ‘antecedents’ of emotions, that is, the “core relational themes” (Lazarus 1991) 
that characterise a certain feeling and can therefore predict its arousal. Although there 
is no consensus on a definite list of these dimensions, academics at least concur on a 
recurring set, such as goal-relevance, responsibility, certainty and control (Smith and 
Ellsworth 1985; Lazarus 1991; Roseman, Antoniou and Jose 1996).  
Regardless of whether we agree with conceptualising emotions according to valence 
(the dimensional approach) or we try to differentiate among them more precisely (the 
discrete approach), what emerges from the literature is that emotions appear inevitably, 
as we navigate the world around us. They have a diagnostic power, in that they com-
municate to the brain what is going on around us and whether or how to attend to it. 
Research has provided extensive evidence of this inherent connection between emo-
tions and cognition. Overall, emotions affect the way we think by influencing three im-
portant areas. 
First, emotions have an impact on the level of attention to the surrounding environ-
ment. Attention is a foundational step for any consequent evaluation and decision-
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making activity, in that it determines whether the individual is going to attend to a stim-
ulus, avoid it or ignore it altogether (Scherer 1982). Defensive emotions have been found 
to increase attention levels, as they affect the individual’s motivation to be vigilant (Mar-
cus et al. 2000). Fear, for example, results in higher levels of attention, as the brain be-
comes interested in collecting more information to reduce uncertainty (Huddy, Feldman 
and Cassese 2007; Valentino, Hutchings, Banks and Davis 2008). Anger has the opposite 
effect, as experiencing this emotion has been found to reduce interest and attention to 
new information and opposite views (MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman and Keele 2007; Red-
lawsk, Civettini, and Lau 2007). This is because, as an ‘approach emotion’ (Carver 2004), 
anger is activated by the system that manages rewards, signaling an obstacle to their 
pursuit (Marcus et al. 2000). As the path to reward is blocked, this emotion communi-
cates to the brain that all attention and interest be diverted to focus exclusively on the 
goal.  
Second, emotions affect our motivation to act. The behavioral component of emo-
tions has long been emphasized, as one of their core effects is to provoke a change in 
behavioral intentions prompting the individual to act or behave in certain ways (Oatley 
and Jenkins 1996; Scherer 2001). Emotions have what has been labeled ‘action tenden-
cies’ (Frijda 1986), in that they signal the brain that a certain course of action is advisable 
in order to meets situational needs. Returning to our previous example on the divergent 
effects of defensive and approach emotions, experiencing anger has been found to mo-
tivate individuals to engage in risk-taking and confrontational behaviour (Lerner, Gonza-
lez, Small and Fischhoff 2003; Brader, Groenendyk and Valentino 2010) whereas the op-
posite effect has been registered for defensive emotions, with fear prompting individu-
als to reconsider their course of action and thus to engage in risk-averse behaviour (Ler-
ner et al. 2003; Druckman and McDermott, 2008).  
Finally, emotions impact the way we form a judgment. As Brader and Marcus (2013) 
argue, the dual-process model of decision-making, holding that individuals process in-
formation based on a ‘fast’ and on a ‘slow’ system, is now widely accepted in the litera-
ture. Interestingly, and opposite to conventional popular understandings, both systems 
are influenced by emotions. The fast system is labelled as such as it relies predominantly 
on more automatic processes and draws heavily on already-formed opinions; this judge-
ment formation route is mostly shaped by approach emotions, which as we have seen 
decrease attention and push towards confrontational action, hence prompting the indi-
vidual towards a less deliberative decision-making (Brader 2006; MacKuen et al. 2007). 
The slow system, on the contrary, is more thoughtful and introspective and is shaped by 
defensive emotions, which foster the brain to examine all collected information 
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carefully, in a widely deliberative mode of information processing (Marcus, Sullivan, 
Theiss-Morse and Stevens 2005; MacKuen et al., 2007; Brader, Valentino and Suhay 
2008). 
The implications are therefore two-fold. First, the idea that our decision-making is 
based on two systems, one exclusively emotional and one predominantly rational, is only 
part of the public imaginary; the picture emerging from academic work is rather one of 
conjunction between emotions and cognition, which work together in guiding our un-
derstanding of the social world. Even the most ‘thoughtful and deliberate’ decisions are 
partly submerged in processes that are prominently affective. Second, emotions do not 
only affect the way we think and make sense of the world, but also the way we act about 
it. As we have seen, emotions have ‘action tendencies’ that prompt individual towards 
one behavior rather than another, based on the information that the emotion itself has 
passed along to the brain. 
As we will see in the following section, this becomes of utmost importance when un-
packing how citizens make sense and act in the political world.  
 
 
3. The Emotional Side of Politics  
 
Rather than ‘the Other to reason’, emotions are an integral part of our decision-mak-
ing process and, as such, of any form of political engagement. Research in political psy-
chology has indeed provided systematic evidence that a substantial part of our political 
life is remarkably affective. Although an exhaustive review of this body of work would 
be impossible here, we can highlight several prominent examples to show that the reach 
of emotions in politics goes well beyond populism.  
Traditional ideologies, usually embodied by mainstream parties, are anchored in emo-
tionality as much as populism may be. Research has shown how conservative thinking 
can be a response to a need to reduce fear and uncertainty (Jost, Kruglanski, Glaser and 
Sulloway 2003), with experimental evidence that priming mortality threats (via terror-
ism) results in post-manipulation conservative identification (Thorisdottir and Jost 
2010). Liberals, on the other hand, are less concerned with fear and rather characterized 
by a higher propensity for empathy (Hsu, Anen, and Quartz 2008; Taber and Young 
2013). This emotion emerges as a distinctive trait of liberal ideology in a number of stud-
ies, highlighting its centrality in underpinning attitudes toward social spending and the 
welfare state (Smith 2006).  
The relevance of emotions in politics can also be seen through the lenses of intergroup 
dynamics. In-group identification is one of the most important factors that influence our 
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social and political life. Individuals have an innate tendency to self-categorize into one 
or multiple groups, as part of a general cognitive function that helps organize and navi-
gate the social world (Higgins 2000). These dynamics are underpinned by affectivity in 
several ways. First, individuals have a need to maintain a positive sense of Self and, for 
this reason, they tend to perceive their in-group more positively than the out-groups 
(Sindic and Condor 2014). Furthermore, identification with the in-group can grow so 
strongly that membership culminates in feelings of psychological attachment (Campbell, 
Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960); membership is thus internalized as part of the Self, 
in what becomes a ‘social identity’ (Tajfel and Turner 1979). The boundaries marking in-
group belonging also separate members from ‘Others’ and hostility towards out-groups 
can increase exponentially whenever challenges or threat to its cohesiveness are per-
ceived (Brewer 2007). Emotions amplify these dynamics by reinforcing internal cohesion 
and increasing motivation to stand up against challenges to the group (Huddy 2013). 
This is evident in the affective polarisation that often circumscribes political parties 
competition (Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky, Malhotra and Westwood 2019). Rather than 
simply divided over issues and policies, citizens are increasingly hostile to members of 
the opposite party in a way that fuels prejudiced thinking and the development of biased 
judgement (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012). This is because, for many, partisanship is an 
identity with often deep and stable affective attachment and not simply an efficient way 
of getting their interests represented (Groenendyk 2018). Distrust or dislike toward the 
opposite camp can escalate to hatred and even reach the point to affect interpersonal 
relations within one’s family or social circle (Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018). 
Beyond political and social psychology, sociological research on political and social 
movements has demonstrated the critical role of emotions in generating, motivating and 
sustaining collective action (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001). For long time, social 
movement research dismissed emotions as irrational and primitive and later stripped 
protestors of emotions in an attempt to support scholars’ over-rationalistic assumptions 
about citizens’ behavior (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2000 for a review). On the con-
trary, the mechanisms that catalyze action and drive participation in social movements 
are underpinned by emotions originating from both moral outrage (Jasper 1998) and the 
pleasure to construct a positive sense of Self (Stein 2001). Emotions are also crucial to 
the day-to-day experience of activism, as the values, symbols and narratives that consti-
tute a movement’s culture reflect affective attachments and sustain participation (Good-
win and Pfaff 2001). The decline of a movement is also linked to emotional dynamics: if 
anger and enthusiasm are pivotal for triggering a desire for activism, disappointment 
and frustration, as well as intra-group rivalry, very often cause groups to fall apart. And 
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even after a movement ceases to exist, emotions help reshape the emotional cultures 
and repertoires for future activism  (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001).  
These are only some examples of how emotions shape different aspects of politics, 
from ideological thinking to group identification, partisan attachment or collective ac-
tion. The crucial take-away point from these strands of research is that emotionality is 
an integral part of the way individuals navigate the surrounding environment and make 
relevant decisions; as such it is also vital to any type of political engagement. Affective 
reactions are automatic and inevitable and there is no ‘rational’ thinking that it is entirely 
independent from emotions.   
 
 
4. Emotions and Populism 
 
While there is a tendency to ascribe a significant part of populist success to the role 
of emotions, all forms of politics must comprise affective dimensions that engage citi-
zens (Alvares and Dahlgren 2016). Building upon the research findings explored in earlier 
sections, I suggest that the question we should rather ask is what is peculiar about the 
relationship between emotions and populism. 
I propose analysing this relationship by looking at three broad dimensions - the struc-
tural, subjective and communicative dimensions. Examining these different levels of 
analysis allows us to unpack the significance of emotions for the emergence, diffusion 
and success of populism. The ‘Structural Dimension’ looks at those studies that have 
identified a series of macro processes and long-term trends that link the role of emotions 
to support for populism, by pointing out the development of an affective fertile ground; 
the ‘Subjective Dimension’ draws on the political psychology literature documenting, 
more specifically, what those affective states are, how they are perceived at the individ-
ual level and why they make citizens more prone to populist appeals; finally, the ‘Com-
municative Dimension’ section discusses studies from different traditions that are 
brought together by their interest in how emotionality intertwines with populist dis-
course to address the publics’ affective requests.  
 
The Structural Dimension 
The relationship between emotions and populism originates first and foremost at the 
macro, structural level. Several works interested in unpacking the populist appeal and 
success have highlighted how our contemporary societies provide a particular affective 
breeding ground for populist discourse to resonate. As I will show below, it is several 
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processes that, in particular, have been identified as contributors and facilitators of pop-
ulist success. 
Political scientists have principally focused on the role played by globalisation pro-
cesses. The scholarship that addresses the root causes of support for populist parties 
identifies globalisation as an important cause of those complex affective reactions that 
citizens of post-industrial societies are experiencing. For Inglehart and Norris (2016), the 
progress and advancements associated with globalisation have created a new social 
cleavage between those who embrace post-materialist values and those who fear the 
rapid erosion of previously predominant views. Such cleavage has a significant affective 
underpinning: it divides citizens whose preferences have increasingly shifted towards 
‘progressive issues’, such as cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, from those who re-
ject these developments, which they perceive as a form of displacement. Seen through 
these lenses, the success of the populist radical right (which is what the authors are fo-
cusing on, despite their use of the general ‘populism’ label) has a lot to do with the pro-
foundly emotional issues of identity, attachment and belonging. Affect is deeply em-
broiled in citizens’ responses as well: in fact, supporters of traditional values, such as the 
older generations or the less educated, resent and blame the ‘cosmopolitan’ elites for 
the erosion of their previously predominant views and polarise towards the anti-estab-
lishment and conservative appeal of the populist radical right. 
Whereas Inglehart and Norris’ theory places emphasis on the cultural backlash that 
has given rise to populist success, the losers of globalisation thesis (Grande and Kriesi 
2012) has been largely linked to the issue of economic decline and has become as 
shortcut to imply that conditions of economic crisis and unemployment favour the suc-
cess of populist parties. However, Grande and Kriesi’s argument is broader and again 
provides a useful picture of how globalisation has affected subjective feelings of griev-
ances and threat perception. As the authors argue, globalisation has created new forms 
of conflict, not only economic but also cultural and political, that have disproportionately 
affected certain sectors of society. By increasing economic competition, cultural diver-
sity and political integration, globalisation has produced ‘winners and losers’. The latter, 
in particular, experience economic insecurity, feelings of cultural threat from people 
with different ethnic or religious backgrounds, and feelings of loss over weakened na-
tional autonomy. The appeal of supporting populist parties is therefore inherently about 
the emotional need to address such grievances.  
Eatwell and Goodwin (2018) have highlighted how complex and deeply rooted these 
grievances are, providing a comprehensive picture of populist success that involves feel-
ings of distrust and deprivation, alongside processes that have caused destruction and 
dealignment (they label these, “the four Ds”). In this account as well, populism (or what 
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the authors call national populism to clarify the rightist connotation of their empirical 
focus) is profoundly emotional; it is successful precisely because it speaks to people that 
have long distrusted political elites, that have felt increasingly economically deprived 
and sceptical about the ability of their community to survive the fast-pace changes that 
immigration was bringing in; all of this while citizens are increasingly detached from po-
litical parties and apathetic towards politics. The role of insecurities is pivotal here, as 
these broad feelings of ‘distrust’, ‘destruction’ and ‘deprivation’ can be identified in a 
series of strong fears and concerns that citizens have developed, respectively, about lack 
of voice, ethnic change and economic loss. A further crucial takeaway point in this anal-
ysis is that these processes and grievances are long-term and now deeply rooted and 
that we should be wary of those analyses that try to pinpoint one single and recent cause 
for populist success.  
As these studies show, a complex range of structural processes has created particular 
affective states of grievances and insecurities, providing fertile ground for the populist 
appeal to resonate. This research is therefore highly relevant because it documents the 
structural dimension of the link between populism and emotions, and lays the theoreti-
cal ground for investigating how these macro insecurities are perceived and internalized 
by individuals and how they are translated into narratives by political actors, which is the 
focus of the next sections. 
 
The Subjective Dimension 
The structural dimension has highlighted how a particular affective state, the sense of 
insecurity, dominates post-industrial societies and creates a fertile ground for the popu-
list message to resonate. The question that this section aims to answer is how do citizens 
perceive and make sense of such changes in the structure, and more importantly how 
this is connected to support for populism.  
Political scientists Grande and Kriesi (2012) have anticipated that globalisation plays a 
crucial role, because by increasing competition in economic, cultural and political do-
mains it has indeed brought about competition over jobs, cultural and political identities. 
For political theorists Salmela and von Scheve (2017, 2018), such emphasis on competi-
tion - typical of contemporary capitalist and highly individualist advanced societies - pro-
duces a sense of anticipated shame in those individuals who fail (or fear of failing) to 
maintain their status.  Shame is ‘anticipated’ in that it signals a potential or expected loss 
for which individuals blame themselves; it resembles a sense of failure and incapacity, 
so painful that the individual diverts it from the Self and directs it as anger to others. The 
authors call this process of emotional repression and transmutation, ressentiment. 
Salmela and von Scheve thus provide a significant theoretical contribution, which 
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unpacks the mechanisms that explain how changes in the ‘structure’ may have affected 
the ‘subjective’ level, in turn providing ground for populist success. Their theory has yet 
to be tested empirically, but it points out how understanding the role and impact of in-
securities for populism success is becoming increasingly relevant. 
Political psychologists label these feelings as ontological insecurities because they 
concern individuals’ own ‘being’ and refer to their need to have a stable, safe and secure 
sense of Self (Giddens 1991). Ontological insecurities may be less visible or latent, but 
studying them allows taking into account the role of contemporary anxieties about a 
wide range of issues - from culture, to the economy or the welfare state - which are 
currently fuelling political change but that institutional, legal and policy analyses fail to 
grasp (Kinnvall, Manners and Mitzen 2018). Ontological insecurities are complex affec-
tive states that intertwine in the web of past, present and future, as certain individuals 
long for the past and a reassuring present, while others fear what is to come (Kinnvall 
2018). Taking an ontological security perspective enriches the scholarly understanding 
of populist success because it gives centre stage to the subjective meaning that individ-
uals construct and attribute to their life experience, both in the present and as projected 
to the future, rather than to the objective conditions that are said to leave some people 
‘behind’. Indeed, political psychology research has found evidence that subjective per-
ceptions are key and that citizens not only support populists when feeling deprived, but 
also in times of economic prosperity that they do not want to lose in the future (Mols 
and Jetten 2016).  
The relevance of insecurity for understanding the populist appeal at the individual-
level of analysis is also evident when examined through the lenses of emotionality, as 
almost all emotions linked to populism have an important insecurity dimension. Fear and 
anxiety are predominantly linked to populism precisely because of the insecurity that is 
said to emerge from macro-level processes (Grande and Kriesi 2012; Inglehart and Norris 
2016). Nostalgia, typically linked to right-wing populism, has an insecurity dimension in 
that it addresses the anxiety of the present about a world that has become increasingly 
corrupted and distorted, by providing the comfort and security of the past imaginary 
(Kenny 2017).  The nostalgic sentiment is thus as a symptom of a broader call for stability 
and continuity, in a world that for many is becoming unrecognizable. Also anger has an 
insecurity dimension, in that it may be the explicit reaction to more intimate vulnerabil-
ities (Salmela and von Scheve 2017, 2018), emerging from the inability to keep up with 
the world’s complexity (Capelos and Demertzis 2018).  
Understanding insecurity and the emotions of insecurity is pivotal for developing a 
comprehensive account of populist success, one that takes into account the fact the au-
diences are not mere spectators, but appraise and interpret political developments 
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differently and may feel divergently about them. It therefore becomes crucial to take 
this complexity with us when analysing how people’s feelings interact with populist com-
munication. 
 
The Communicative Dimension 
After examining the conditions that have provoked a stoking sense of insecurity in post-
industrial societies and how citizens are emotionally affected by such changes, we now 
turn to how populist actors communicate with their publics. I will focus in particular on 
how they address contemporary affective requests by constructing meaning and provid-
ing interpretations through the use of narratives and emotions. 
Research on populist political communication has been a prolific field of enquiry and 
significant attention has been devoted to identifying the main discursive strategies that 
populist parties rely upon. As Wirz (2018) notes, the findings in this literature can be 
systematised into two broad strategies. On the one hand, populists use advocative mes-
sages to refer to ‘the people’, narrating its monolithic and uniform character, stressing 
its virtues and achievement, presenting populist actors as intimately belonging to the 
category of the ordinary men. Advocative messages help construct a homogeneous in-
group and serve as a justification platform for demanding that power be back to the 
people. On the other hand, they use conflictive messages to exclude, discredit and blame 
elites and the so-called ‘dangerous Others’ (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 2015).  All 
those that do not belong to the people are most commonly denigrated through the at-
tribution of bad characteristics and blamed for the difficulties that the people have to 
face. Conflictive messages therefore serve as a base to reject that power continues lying 
in the hand of elites.  
Both these communication strategies are prominently affective. Conflictive messages 
convey negative emotionality towards out-groups, building hostility towards all of those 
who simply do not belong. Research has focused in particular on the enemification prac-
tises of the populist radical right. For instance, Kinnvall (2014) has highlighted that the 
discursive delineation of enemies both outside and inside the nation is a recurrent char-
acteristics of these parties. Similarly, Wodak (2015) has shown how, by instrumentalising 
certain actors as scapegoats and constructing them as threatening, populists produce a 
‘politics of fear’. However, as I will show below, the inherent confrontation constructed 
by populist communication should be seen as extending beyond a monolithic experience 
of fear. 
Populists are in fact more prone to discursive blame attributions than other political 
actors (Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou and Exadaktylos 2014) and this has consistently 
been found to elicit anger (Wagner 2014). Anger is a crucial emotion in populist politics 
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because, by engaging heavily with discourses of morality and injustice, populism taps 
into the core relational themes of this emotion (Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza 2017). Fur-
thermore, anger may also be the explicit reaction to more intimate vulnerabilities 
(Salmela and von Scheve 2017, 2018). In particular, right-wing populist rhetoric pro-
motes anger with a discourse that is crafted to “deflect shame-induced anger and hatred 
away from the self and instead toward the political and cultural establishment and vari-
ous Others” (Salmela and von Scheve 2018, 443). The populist left, on the other hand, 
acknowledges rather than represses shame, as both its discourse and networked struc-
ture foster solidarity and the sharing of grievances. Their social movement culture, based 
on the ideal of participation, encourages a collaborative sentiment and allows for the 
transformation of shame “into high-energy, active emotions such as frustration, indig-
nation and anger” (ibid, 446).  
Another integral feature of populist communication, especially on the Right, is nostal-
gia. For Kenny (2017) nostalgic appeals in populist discourse respond to visions of the 
contemporary world as disrupted by fast-pace socio-economic change. The populist nar-
rative portrays the inability of the governing elites to attend, manage or halt such 
changes, as the principle cause that makes the present a moment of severe danger. The 
past, on the other hand, has already been lived and so shown to be feasible (Taggart 
2004). Nostalgia, therefore, “offers an important route back to the past, and taps into 
an established emotional repertoire, while simultaneously marshaling arguments aimed 
at justifying new pathways in the present” (Kenny 2017, 260). With these appeals, pop-
ulists address that sentiment of anxiety about the present that is prominent in contem-
porary societies, as many feel that the world surrounding them has become increasingly 
corrupted and distorted and has turned them into ‘strangers in their own land’ 
(Hochschild 2016). Populist nostalgic appeals tame these feelings by providing the com-
fort and security of the past imaginary.  
The bittersweet element of nostalgic emotionality helps us transition to the role of 
positive affect in populist discourse, which is often sidelined in the literature.  The nar-
ration infused of negative emotions is in fact complemented by a positive self-construc-
tion that harnesses the positive power of values such as honesty, hard work and ordi-
nariness, which bring the people together (Bonansinga 2019). Here political narratives 
intersect with popular culture and help construct the notion of ‘belonging to the people’. 
After all, as Canovan (1984) noted, the people is an idealised and hyper-vague audience, 
an inclusive and exclusive, integrative and divisive conceptualization, that eventually 
means different things to different populists. Therefore, what does it means to be part 
of the ordinary people? Populists foster a sense of belonging by drawing on two main 
narratives: the commonality of values and the commonality of experiences (Bonansinga 
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2019). With the first narrative, they focus on the virtues of authenticity and genuinity 
that bring the people together, thus building a strong and positive sense of cohesion. By 
promoting the virtues of the ‘ordinary men’ while also focusing on the populist actor’s 
commitment to defend people’s sovereignty against the out-groups, populist advocative 
communication reflects the core relational themes of, respectively, pride and hope. 
These emotions have indeed been linked to populist communication (Marquart and Mat-
thes 2016). Identities, however, are constructed both internally and externally (Jones 
and Krzyzanowski 2008). Populists build cohesion also by highlighting that the people 
share the common experience of deception and exploitation by self-serving and corrupt 
elites. There is thus a flow of both positive and negative affect that is directed both in-
wards and outwards, toward the people and its enemies (Bonansinga 2019).  
There is therefore a profound emotional complexity in populist communication that 
is important to keep in mind; we should refrain from simplifying populist rhetoric as a 
single-emotion politics (e.g. the politics of fear, the politics of anger) and rather take into 
account that different emotional appeals coexist at the same time and within the same 
narrative. 
This point has been strongly reiterated by sociological research on political mobiliza-
tion. Visual research, in particular, has provided a pivotal contribution in evidencing both 
the complexity and variety of emotions invoked by populists (especially on the Right). 
The strategic use of images, such as the controversial electoral posters frequently circu-
lated by these parties, allows conveying highly charged messages in a simplified and in-
stant way (Richardson and Colombo 2014). Posters build boundaries between in-groups 
and out-groups by mobilising, on the one hand, symbols of pride and belonging and ap-
pealing to the positive affect generated by one’s identity (Flam and Doerr 2015). On the 
other hand, they construct imaginaries of threat and insecurity, by invoking otherness 
(Richardson and Wodak 2009). They also portray an immediate, shared and common 
sense solution to the presumed threat (ibid.), that can certainly appeal to both the relief 
of safety and the thrill of payback, as well as extending an authoritarian appeal to those 
who long for tough responses. This strand of research shows rather powerfully the het-
erogeneity of populist emotional mobilization and its reach well beyond text and narra-
tives.  
Although the majority of scholarship produced, and examined so far, tends to focus 
on right-wing populism, it is crucial to remark that populists address and articulate their 
emotional appeals differently, depending on the ‘exclusionary’ versus ‘inclusionary’ na-
ture of their populist ideology (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). Mudde and Kaltwasser’s 
distinction builds on Margaret Canovan (1984) insights that the ‘content’ of the term 
‘the people’ has several connotations. First, the people may be intended with a 
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‘democratic’ connotation to indicate the ultimate source of power in a democratic re-
gime; hence, the people as the sovereign, the ruler. Second, the term can be used to 
refer to an average socioeconomic status, which usually brings together the majority of 
citizens in a given country; thus the people as ‘the common’ and ‘ordinary’ people. Fi-
nally, the ethno-nationalist connotation gives the term a more nativist dimension and 
appeals to those who are natives of a specific place. For Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
(2013), it is these latter two - socio-economic vs nativist connotations - that constitute 
an important distinction between what they call inclusionary and exclusionary populists: 
whereas the latter define the people strictly as natives and thus construct a large number 
of out-groups, inclusionary populists understand the people more broadly, as those who 
have been aggrieved by neoliberal elites, regardless of ethnicity, religion or culture. As 
Salmela and von Scheve (2018, 440) put it: 
 
 “Right-wing populist rhetoric and discourse promote anger and resentment directed at those 
who have a “good life” without hard work, such as politicians and top managers on high and 
secure income, welfare recipients and refugees “looked after by the state,” and the long-term 
unemployed who “avoid work,” but also at groups perceived to be different from “us”: ethnic, 
cultural, political, and sexual minorities. By contrast, left-wing discourse and rhetoric instill anger 
and resentment at those responsible for enforcing politics perceived to increase injustice, ine-
quality, and precariousness, such as national governments and supranational institutions”.  
 
Therefore, different populists direct their narratives to different affective ‘recipients’, 
which reflect dissimilar constructions of ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ and the meanings 
ascribed to them.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Social and political sciences suffer from a significant normative bias against emotion-
ality that is only being redressed by the recent affective turn (Demertizis 2014). Populism 
has long been labelled an ‘emotional’ phenomenon, with the adjective used predomi-
nantly in negative terms to indicate an opportunistic discourse that manipulates citizens’ 
passions. Such normative bias is not only an academic or journalistic matter; it is widely 
rooted in the idea of a clear-cut divide between emotions and reason, which makes de-
cision-making based on the former too ‘fast’ and ‘unreliable’.  
By exploring the world of emotions from a psychological perspective, this article has 
shown that the dichotomy heart versus mind hardly stands up to scientific inquiry. Sys-
tematic and compelling evidence now sustains an idea of decision-making as a function 
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that relies conjunctly on emotions and cognition. Rather than marked by a divide, emo-
tionality and rationality are intimately related and interdependent from each other. This 
does not certainly exclude the political domain: although with different degrees, func-
tions and effects, all aspects of our engagement with politics are characterized by im-
portant affective underpinnings.  
Building upon such evidence, we can argue that the role of emotions is a significant 
factor that helps disentangling the puzzle of the populist appeal, but not because popu-
lism is an ‘emotional’ phenomenon in an ‘unemotional and entirely rational’ political 
world; rather, populism is peculiarly emotional, as specific affective states contribute to 
its rise, development and success.  As the have seen, their role features prominently in 
the scholarship interested in identifying the structural opportunities for populist success: 
indeed, populism finds a fertile emotional ground in contemporary post-industrial soci-
eties where a series of processes of at the macro-level have brought about increasing 
insecurities. The scholarship in political psychology is complementing these accounts 
with a fast developing research agenda looking at the individual-level factors that con-
tribute to populist success, as the public perceives and internalises these structural 
changes differently. In this discipline as well, in particular in recent years, there has been 
an increase of attention to the role of affects and analyses have shown how citizens have 
developed a variety of ontological insecurities that differ in their referent object, as this 
can span from perceived cultural dilution to economic distress; ontological insecurities 
are also extremely complex affective states because they intertwine in the web of past, 
present and future, and can be manifested through divergent expressions of grievances. 
At the intersection between the structural and subjective levels, populist communication 
becomes pivotal in the construction, interpretation and reproduction of insecurity nar-
ratives. Even though the structural and subjective level may create a favourable affective 
space, it is the narratives provided at the political level that construct particular inter-
pretations in turn affecting the way citizens make sense of unfolding political events. 
Political leaders’ judgments are therefore central in guiding the deconstruction of infor-
mation and the creation of meaning and this marks the clearest point of departure from 
mainstream parties. The focus on the agency of populist actors, manifested through the 
use of narratives, serves as an analytical bridge to understand why certain interpreta-
tions are favored and become dominant in some contexts but not in others. Populists, 
on the left and on the right, have built their deeply affective accounts of who is the dan-
ger, who is in danger and who is to blame, that are crafted to respond to contemporary 
affective requests. Populist narratives become the lenses through which meaning is con-
structed, attributed and transferred; interestingly, they attend to affective requests 
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through the further mobilisation of emotionality, creating the affective glue that can po-
tentially translate grievances into support.  
Analyzing the emotions-populism relationship by looking in conjunction at the struc-
tural, subjective and communicative levels is thus useful to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of emotions as a significant contributor to populist success. This analytical 
framework captures the vital interconnections between how emotions are produced at 
the macro-level, perceived at the individual level but also guided, shaped and repro-
duced through political narratives. Rather than focusing exclusively on a single dimen-
sion, a multi-level analysis has the advantage to unpack the significance of emotions for 
the entire process of populism emergence, diffusion and success. 
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